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´:HFDQQRWOHWWKLVKDSSHQDJDLQµReversing UK flood policy in response to the Somerset 
Levels floods, 2014 
 
 
Abstract 
.LQJGRQ·V (1995) Multiple Streams Framework offers a theoretical account of how policy proposals 
PRYH IURP ODWHQW SRVVLELOLWLHV WR EHFRPLQJ IDYRXUHG IRU LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ :H DSSO\ .LQJGRQ·V
framework in the context of the policy response to the 2013-14 flooding of the Somerset Levels and 
Moors. Stakeholder interviews and analysis of news media coverage evidence the way in which a 
specific policy option that had fallen out of favour with the national Environment Agency - 
dredging - came to the fore and was eventually adopted during the period in which the conjunction 
of problem, policy and political pressures came to a head. Local political activists mobilised a wider 
campaign with the help of social media and capitalised on national political sensitivities to 
successfully promote dredging. What is less clear is the longevity of the policy reversal, given 
funding constraints.  
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1. Introduction 
Much debate surrounds the governance of flood risk in the UK today (Butler & Pidgeon 2011; 
Johnson & Priest 2008; Porter & Demeritt 2012; Scrase & Sheate 2005). Should the tried-and-tested 
SUDFWLFHRIEXLOGLQJ ¶IORRGGHIHQFHV·FRQWLQXHRUVKRXOGZHEHWKLQNLQJDERXWPDQDJLQJIORRGULVN
GLIIHUHQWO\" $V D IDLUO\ ZHW FRXQWU\ WKH 8. KDV KLVWRULFDOO\ JRQH GRZQ WKH ¶IORRG GHIHQFH· URXWH
(Penning-Rowsell et al 1986). To transform wetlands into agriculturally productive farmlands, or 
simply to keep floodwaters away from densely populated areas, pumps have been used to drain land, 
dredge rivers, and erect embankments (Purseglove 1988). Total defence against flooding is, and 
always has been, an unrealistic and impractical goal, however¶+DUG·HQJLQHHULQJVROXWLRQVDUHJLYLQJ
ZD\WR¶VRIWHU·PHDVXUHVGHVLJQHGWRZRUNZLWKQDWXUHQRWDJDLQVWLW7KLVJUDGXDOVKLIWIURP¶IORRG
GHIHQFH· WR ¶IORRG ULVN PDQDJHPHQW· LV QHDWO\ HQFDSVXODWHG LQ WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW·V PRVW UHFHQW
flood strategy: Making Space for Water (Defra 2005). The Flood and Water Management Act 2010 
gives local authorities the lead responsibility for co-ordinating and co-operating in flood 
management efforts: such changes speak to the new ¶ORFDOLVW·political discourse in the UK. Localism 
argues that ´by taking into account the local context and needs of local actors, more democratic and 
better decision-making processes can be enabledµ (Begg et al 2015: 689). In other words, those 
affected by flood risk should have a much greater say in how flood risk is managed locally.  
Even with these political changes, and many decades of investment, flooding remains a 
major concern. The intensity and frequency of flood events, as well as associated costs, are expected 
to increase as part of a changing climate (Evans et al, 2004). In England and Wales, over five million 
people and two million properties are at-risk of flooding (EA 2009a). Budget cuts to the 
Environment Agency, the public body responsible for managing flood risk in England, have raised 
questions about the protection afforded to people and properties. Indeed, its flood policy of 
GLVFRXUDJLQJ ¶KDUG· HQJLQHHULQJ VROXWLRns came under intense scrutiny during the winter of 
2013/2014. With the wettest winter of record, the Somerset Levels and Moors, an area of 
approximately 650km2 in the southwest of England, was subjected to severe and prolonged flooding. 
More than 115km2 of land were inundated. For several months, roads were impassable, businesses 
came to a halt, villages were abandoned and residents evacuated (House of Commons 2014). The 
sheer scale and extent of the floods drew considerable media attention as Government ministers and 
officials were asked what they planned to do. Under mounting pressure to visit affected areas, the 
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%ULWLVK3ULPH0LQVWHU'DYLG&DPHURQDGPLWWHGWRMRXUQDOLVWVWKDW¶ZHFDQQRWOHWWKLVKDSSHQDJDLQ·
(Dominiczak 2014).  
In response, local councils and residents were consulted and a 20-year action plan agreed to 
reduce flooding in the region. Under the £100million plan, new tidal barriers, sluice gates, and extra 
pumping stations are to be installed, but notably, the Environment Agency reversed its flood policy 
and agreed to dredge the Rivers Parrett and Tone (SCC 2014). This commitment to river dredging 
marked a key victory for local campaign groups who had fought for several years to put it back on 
the policy agenda (FLAG 2014). For local residents, dredging ² the process of removing sediment 
from the bottom of a river to maintain/increase its channel capacity ² was favoured as a visible, 
¶KDUG· HQJLQHHULQJ VROXWLRQ WR WKH SUREOHP RI IORRGLQJ <HW WKH (QYLronment Agency remained 
unconvinced. Lord Smith, the Chairman of the Environment Agency, insisted that although 
GUHGJLQJFRXOGKDYHSRWHQWLDOO\UHGXFHGWKHGXUDWLRQRIWKHIORRGVLW¶ZRXOGSUREDEO\PDNHDVPDOO
GLIIHUHQFH· DQG ¶ZRXOGQRWKDYH VROYHG WKHSUREOHP· (Smith 2014). After two decades of ignoring 
river dredging as an option for managing flood risk, irrespective of its local popularity (EA 2009), we 
seek to shed some light on the circumstances around the sudden (and perhaps temporary) reversal 
of a national flood management policy in this particular location.  
More particularly, wHDUJXHWKDW.LQJGRQ·V(1995) thesis of how policy proposals move from 
latent possibilities to becoming favored for implementation has considerable relevance here ² 
though we also take the view that, while helpful, it is limited in its depth of explanation.  .LQJGRQ·V 
(1995) thesis on policy change, known as the Multiple Streams Framework, offers a heuristic for 
understanding how and why environmental policies gain or lose political support in fields such as 
climate change (Keskitalo et al 2013; Pralle 2009), flood risk (Johnson et al 2005; Penning-Rowsell et 
al 2006), and food production (Ackrill & Kay 2011). For Kingdon, a major crisis can act as a catalyst 
IRUFKDQJHRSHQLQJXS¶ZLQGRZVRIRSSRUWXQLW\·WKDWDOORZQHZLGHDVRUH[LVWLQJRQHVWRMXPSXS
the policy agenda as the three streams: (i) defining what is the problem, (ii) identifying what are the 
policy responses, and (iii) the politics of the situation at hand, all converge. We consider the re-
emergence of river dredging in the Somerset Levels and Moors as a case study that closely 
FRUUHVSRQGVZLWK.LQJGRQ·VWKHVLV, but that it quite likely also highlights the role of pre-existing and 
often longstanding advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1999) that merit a follow-up study. We use national 
and local newspaper coverage as well stakeholder interviews to inform and evidence the shift in 
policy towards dredging.  
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In terms of the structure of the paper, first we turn to the conceptual and policy 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI.LQJGRQ·V0XOWLSOH6WUHDPV)UDPHZRUNDQGLPSRUWDQWO\KRZLW·VEHHQDSSOLHGLQ
context of UK flood risk management policy. After discussing our data and methods, we explore 
how local and national newspapers have talked about the problem of flooding in the Somerset 
Levels and Moors, and to what the extent river dredging was advanced as a viable solution, prior to 
the 2013/2014 events. We then discuss how local and national newspapers reacted when the 
Somerset Levels flooded for the second time in two years, as political pressure grew on the 
government and the Environment Agency to deliver an immediate and long-lasting response. That 
is, to dredge the rivers. Our analysis is supported by ten interviews conducted with key stakeholders 
immediately who were involved in or familiar with the case.  The paper closes by commenting on 
the extent to which the case study of the Somerset Levels and Moors is explained by .LQJGRQ·V
thesis and what lessons the floods have for us in terms of flood policy design. 
 
2. Theoretical and policy context 
Whilst the development of flood policy in the UK has been gradual, it has also experienced 
punctuations: sudden policy shifts or responses triggered by public concern following a major flood 
HYHQW :LONLQV ,Q WKLV VHFWLRQZH ILUVWGHVFULEH.LQJGRQ·V account of such punctuations as 
well as provide an overview of flood risk management policy in the England. In this way, we aim to 
comment not only on how historical and current approaches have emerged and been adopted, but 
also on how flood risk management may develop in future, as an interplay of different factors, 
including the national political response to public opinion, are amplified by media coverage and 
come to reflect pre-existing coalitions.   
 
.LQJGRQ·VMultiple Streams Framework 
.LQJGRQ·V  0XOWLSOH 6WUHDPV )UDPHZRUN VHHNV WR H[SODLQ ZK\ SDUWLFXODU SROLFLHV gain 
prominence above others on the political or policy agendas. The framework describes the agenda 
setting process and how different, relatively independent streams ² problems, policies, and politics ² 
converge to form a policy or resolution. The problem stream describes the process by which an issue 
becomes perceived as something that requires D SROLF\ ´VROXWLRQµ now. This occurs when those 
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involved in the policy making process agree that the situation needs attention and a consensus exists 
that this particular solution will remedy the problem.   
Within the policy stream, a large number of policy recommendations and alternative solutions 
IORDWLQD´SULPHYDOVRXSµ7KHVHLGHDVFRPSHWHIRUDFFHSWDQFHLQpolicy networks. The selection of 
a particular policy option, advocated by policy entrepreneurs promoting their preferred options, 
depends not simply on the quality of the idea, but rather the persuasiveness of the entrepreneur, the 
technical feasibility, the degree of fit with prevailing values and expectations regarding future 
constraints or limits to the proposed solution (Kingdon 1995). Finally, politics, including shifts in the 
national mood, interest group campaigns, or election results, can influence how public problems and 
potential solutions are defined and what criteria is used to assess them in the political stream. Each 
stream can act as a driver or barrier to placing a proposal on or off, or higher or lower, on a policy 
agenda (John 1998; Kingdon 1995).   
The conditions under which these three streams are coupled allow a ´ZLQGRZ RI
RSSRUWXQLW\µWRDSSHDU$VWKHVWUHDPVDUHFRQVWDQtly evolving, these windows may not be open for 
long DQG FDQ EH RSHQHG ´E\ WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI FRPSHOOLQJ SUREOHPV RU E\ KDSSHQLQJV LQ WKH
SROLWLFDO VWUHDPµ .LQJGRQ : 20). The opportunity may be expected, adhering to a political 
schedule or unpredictable, resulting from the ´VKRFNHYHQWµ of a  major flood, for example.    
But why can an event such as a flood have such marked effect on policy? For Donaldson et 
al. (2013), flooding becomes controversial during the time immediately during or shortly after an 
event, particularly for those who have been repeatedly flooded. As a result, institutional failures are 
often perceived and inquiries held into their action (or lack thereof). Those affected seek to make 
sense of the situation and to attribute blame (Harries, 2013), a process that the news media can play 
an influential role in through amplifying and extending discussion through a ¶blame game·: of who is 
at fault or responsible and why (Cloke 2014; Porter 2014). 
The Multiple Streams Framework has been widely applied to understand how policies 
develop and why. In the context of flood policy, Penning-Rowsell et al (2006) examined four major 
flood events in the UK and the policies step changes that followed. They provide empirical evidence 
LQ VXSSRUW RI .LQJGRQ·V ´ZLQGRZV RI RSSRUWXQLW\µ WKHVLV DV ZHOO DV KLJKOLJKWLQJ ORQJ SHULRGV RI
relatively stable policies. For instance, they found that flood policy accelerations are most often 
(though not exclusively) based upon advancing existing ideas rather than developing new ideas. They 
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also suggest that there may be signals within the current policy discourse that are able to indicate or 
predict future policy shifts. Indeed, Johnson et al (2005) highlight how crises can act as catalysts for 
change where incremental policy changes, over long periods, feed into sudden policy shifts.  
Applying the Multiple Streams Framework, Carter and Jacobs (2013) were also able to 
explain transformations in the UK·V SROLFLHV RQ climate change and energy from 2006 to 2010.  
+RZHYHUWKH\ZHUHRQO\DEOHWRGRVRE\LQFRUSRUDWLQJHOHPHQWVRI%DXPJDUWQHUDQG-RQHV·V
Punctuated Equilibrium Model, which describes situations in which windows are open for much 
longer periods of time, defining phases of stability punctuated by shorter phases of change.  
Drawing RQDVSHFWVRI6LPRQ·V%RXQGHG5DWLRQDOLW\0RGHO as well, Carter and Jacobs (2013) 
GHVFULEH WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK DFWRUV PDNH GHFLVLRQV LQ UHDFWLRQ WR ´VKRFN HYHQWVµ ZLWK OLPLWHG
information and time and often reaching a more socially acceptable solution than one that may be 
preferable in terms of other, technical norms.  Motives in such pressured contexts are rationalised by 
the uncertainties that actors feel regarding their precise objectives, leading to unduly rapid political 
decision-making (Zahariadis 2007).  
Each of the studies listed above focuses on flood events that had national consequences; few 
studies have explored the applicability of the framework to environmental agenda-setting to other 
political systems or different scales (Carter and Jacobs 2013). The Somerset Levels and Moors case 
illustrates how different factors can raise the salience of a local case to such an extent that national 
policy needs to respond.  
 
2.2 Brief overview of flood risk management in England 
2.1.1 Flood risk responsibilities 
In England, responsibility for flood risk management policy and its implementation is divided on a 
national-scale between the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), who 
formulates flood policies, and the Environment Agency, who oversees flood risk management 
operations and advises on planning control (Donaldson et al. 2013; Porter & Demeritt 2012). These 
different roles are ODLGRXWPRUHFOHDUO\LQ'HIUD·Vmost recent flood strategy: Making Space for Water 
(2005), and were re-emphasized in reviews following major UK floods in 2007 (Pitt 2008) and the 
passing of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. 
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 Whereas the Environment Agency provides a strategic overview in developing long-term 
approaches for tackling flood risk and coastal erosion problems via Catchment Flood Management 
Plans and Shoreline Management Plans, local partners including Internal Drainage Boards, Lead 
Local Flood Authorities (LLFA), district/borough councils, and water and sewage service providers 
are increasingly responsible for assessing and managing flood risk locally (Begg et al 2015; Butler & 
Pidgeon 2011). At the local level, LLFAs such as the Somerset County Council are required to 
´GHYHORS maintain, apply and monitor a sWUDWHJ\IRUORFDOIORRGULVNPDQDJHPHQWµ, investigate local 
flooding incidents, and assess the costs and benefits of new measures and importantly how they will 
be paid for (Trafford Council 2014). This push towards localism has gained increasing momentum 
since 2011 with Defra no longer fully funding flood defence schemes (Begg et al 2015; Defra 2011a). 
Instead, funding must come from other sources as well. Indeed, local councils and businesses are 
expected to contribute. 6LPSO\SXWWKHLGHDLVIRU*RYHUQPHQWWR´HQFRXUDJHFRPPXQLWLHVWRLQYHVW
in measures to protect them, so that more can be done whilst giving communities a bigger sayµ
(Defra 2011b: 4). 
 For Johnson and Priest (2008), this joining-up of national and local actors should allow for 
greater transparency and participation between the state, communities and individuals as well as the 
public and private sectors, over how flood protection schemes are implemented. The extent to 
which this approach remains multi-agency means an inherent risk remains for poor coordination at 
the local level between different actors, particularly as there is limited formal guidance regarding 
ways of achieving and operationalizing flood risk management plans. This can be problematic in the 
pressured circumstances such as a major flooding event, in terms of ZKR·V in charge or responsible 
for different activities. In the case of the Somerset Levels and Moors 2013-14 floods, there was 
considerable debate as to where responsibilities lay (BBC News 2014b, FLAG 2014). 
 
2.2.2 River dredging and flood risk management in the Somerset Levels and Moors  
River dredging LVDWHFKQLTXHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDQHPSKDVLVRQVWUXFWXUDO¶KDUG·HQJLQHHULQJVROXWLRQV
to contain large volumes of water in order to protect agricultural interests and to improve food 
productivity. It involves the widening and/or deepening of waterways to allow for more water to 
pass through a channel, as a means of alleviating flooding or draining land (CIWEM 2014). The 
process, however, is often site-specific due to variations in floodplains and river morphology. 
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Sediment removal can result in destabilizing consequences if not managed appropriately, including 
severe disruption to the flora and fauna of the ecosystem (House of Commons 2014). Due to 
natural fluvial processes, dredging is not a permanent flood management solution and in the context 
of inland waterways the process has to be repeatedly implemented every five to ten years (CIWEM 
2014). Dredging is also a particularly expensive process, with estimates of up to £20,000 per 
kilometer along the Parrett River (SDBC 2012). Given these concerns, the Environment Agency had 
directed investment away from dredging, pushing it down, if not off, the policy agenda (EA 2009a). 
Moreover, the Environment $JHQF\·V EXGJHW KDV EHHQ WLJKWHQHG in recent years, with tougher 
targets introduced for flood risk management and defence schemes. For example, for every £1 of 
investment, an average of £8 of avoided damage is required (EA 2009a; House of Commons 2014). 
In areas with low population density, such as the Somerset Levels and Moors, it has become 
increasingly difficult to pass the economic thresholds for government investment.  
While there has been a long history of dredging and river maintenance in the Somerset 
Levels and Moors, no dredging has happened in the region for 20 years prior to the 2013-14 floods 
(FLAG 2014). Sitting at an average of around three to four metres above sea level, the area is prone 
to both salt and fresh water flooding.  Current coastal defences are in place to withstand a 1-in-200 
year flood, while a series of river lock gates, drainage channels and ditches along the two major 
rivers in the area, the Parrett and Tone, have been designed to withstand a 1-in-50-year flood (Quinn 
et al, 2013). FLAG (2014), a local community campaign group, and the Somerset Drainage Boards 
Consortium (SDBC 2013) highlighted a 2012 modelling study by the Environment Agency, 
indicating that the Parrett and Tone river channels in key locations had been reduced to about 65% 
of their 1960 capacity. Although the rainfall experienced during this event was only 10% more than 
the previous wettest winter when there was no flooding event, the (QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\·VPRGHOOLQJ
indicated that dredging would have reduced the level and duration of the 2013-14 flooding in 
modelled locations, but would not have prevented it (SDBC 2013).   
 
2.3 Media influence on shaping policy 
Despite many other flood events happening throughout the UK during the winter of 2013-14, the 
Somerset Levels and Moors case received extensive and prolonged national media attention. The 
role of the news media in policy development is the object of considerable academic interest. In the 
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specific context of flooding, Escobar and Demeritt (2014) have emphasized the influence played by 
the news media in shaping politics and management of flood risk by serving as a driver for policy 
development and also as a medium for communication between interest groups, policymakers, and 
the public. Policy change is often driven by the immediacy of the event (Wilkins 2000) and the news 
media provide a powerful means of emphasising a need for urgent action. This sense of urgency can 
risk compromising long-term approaches to risk reduction and tends to bring forward ideas that 
already exist (Penning-Rowsell et al 2006). In this case, engineering-oriented policy responses to 
previous flooding, since superseded in influence, became resurgent in the development of a new 20-
year flood plan and the revitalization of dredging regional rivers. 
 
3. Data and methods 
Our research brings together two datasets collected during the summer of 2014. The first is a textual 
analysis of newsprint articles (n=275) on the subject of river dredging published in local and national 
newspapers over a twenty-year period, from 1st January 1994 to 31st January 2014, held in the 
LexisNexis database. Newsprint is only one news media type and certainly not the only influential 
form of news or communication media in this context, but it is analytically controllable in the sense 
of being a fixed, searchable source. The news articles show the changing frequency of media 
attention given to river dredging in Somerset, which we compared with the experiences and 
concerns raised by interviewees (n=10), who had either lived through and been affected by the 
2013/14 Somerset Levels floods or who are involved professionally in flood risk management. 
 The newsprint analysis was conducted in June 2014, using an online search of the 
LexisNexis newspaper database, to identify relevant news articles in local and national outlets where 
river dredging was discussed. There were two parts to the analysis. First, as the Rivers Parrett and 
Tone in Somerset had not been dredged since the early 1990s (Smith 2014), we selected twelve 
Somerset-based newspapers to gauge local interest in the topic alongside four UK national 
broadsheets: the Guardian, The Independent, The Times, and The Telegraph, and their Sunday editions. 
$OWKRXJK EURDGVKHHW FLUFXODWLRQ ´LV QRW DV KLJK DV WKH WDEORLGV %ULWLVK EURDGVKHHWV HQMR\ JUHDWHU
agenda-setting influence over both policy and other media, which often run with stories first 
broached in WKHEURDGVKHHWVµ(VFREDU	'HPHULWWDOVRVHH&DUYDOKR	%XUJHVV
:H XVHG NH\ZRUGV LQFOXGLQJ ´IORRGµ ´GUHGJµ DQG ´6RPHUVHWµ WR VHDUFK LQ WKH KHDGOLQH OHDG
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paragraph, or indexing of the articles. In total, 188 news articles were returned. We then applied an 
inclusion/exclusion criterion to leave only the most relevant articles (n=64 local and n=91 national 
sources, n=155 total) (see Porter et al 2014).  
Second, to capture media reaction following visits from the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, and the Secretary for the Environment, Owen Pattison, to flooded areas in Somerset in 
late January 2014, we undertook another wave of media analysis for December 2013 and January 
XVLQJNH\ZRUGV´IORRGµDQG´6RPHUVHWµ$WRWDORIQews articles were found before the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria was applied (n=54 local and n=66 national, n=120 total). Each news 
article was examined and assigned a code based upon how dredging was discussed and sorted into 
one of three categories: (1) where dredging was neither argued for nor against; (2) where dredging 
was presented negatively or its use as a flood management option discouraged; and (3) where 
dredging was perceived positively as a solution to flooding problems. Mapping the frequency of 
these codes, and their temporal specificity, not only helps us better understand how the Somerset 
flood event unfolded but also indicates how river dredging gained traction as a policy response to 
the floods both locally and nationally. 
Preliminary analysis of the media findings then informed a round of interviews conducted 
over the summer of 2014 with a purposeful sample of 10 respondents, spanning local government 
officials, Environment Agency staff, professional engineers and residents affected by the floods, to 
showcase the different views held in favour or against the introduction of dredging. Interviewees 
were encouraged to use their own words to talk about the floods; how dredging emerged as a policy 
response; and who they felt should be responsible for its implementation. Interviews were recorded 
(with consent) and transcribed. Interview transcripts were manually coded in NVivo, where thematic 
codes were identified and elaborated upon iteratively.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
Our results and associated discussion are separated into two parts to reflect analysis of, first the 20-
year period preceding the 2013-14 floods; and second, the evolving coverage of the floods in detail. 
 
4.1 Was river dredging a concern prior to the 2012 floods? 
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Those living in Somerset Levels and Moors are no strangers to flooding. Major flood events in 1919, 
1966, 2000, 2012 and 2013/2014 remain constant remLQGHUV RI WKH UHJLRQ·V YXOQHUDELOLW\ $ ORQJ
history of river maintenance has developed as a result as landowners have drained areas to increase 
agricultural production over the centuries, and looked to dredging as a way to manage and lessen 
floodwaters. Our research suggests that prior to 2012, however, dredging was a fairly low-key topic 
as far as the media were concerned. Fewer than a dozen local or national printing articles mentioned 
dredging at all (see Figure 1). Of these, the majority, 56%, were broadly positive about dredging, 
outlining its perceived benefits as a long-term and sustainable solution, enjoying local support. 
However 33% of articles, mostly in the national press, also focused on the negative environmental 
and wildlife effects of dUHGJLQJZLWKHFRORJLVWVZDUQLQJIRUH[DPSOHWKDW´GUHGJLQJYLUWXDOO\ZLSHG
RXW WKH PXVVHO >SRSXODWLRQ@« DQG LW KDV VLQFH IDLOHG WR UHFRYHUµ +DGOLQJWRQ  (YHQ WKH
prolonged flooding experienced in the area in 2000 failed to generate any media attention on 
dredging, with local newspapers not publishing a single article on it between 1994 and 2009. 
[FIGURE 1 ² Newspaper Coverage For or Against Dredging in Somerset, 1994-2013] 
$WWHQWLRQJUHZFRQVLGHUDEO\DQGVXGGHQO\ LQDV WKH´ZRUVW IORRGV LQ OLYLQJPHPRU\µ
struck Somerset in April and then again in December (Somerset County Gazette 2012). With the 
wettest winter since records began (Met Office 2013), floodwaters cut off access to communities for 
over 100 days. Between 2012 and mid-2013, 26 news articles (n=15 local and n=11 national, n=26 
total) were written in response to the floods. Only 4% of these articles raised any concerns about 
dredging. By contrast, the majority, 81%, spoke strongly in favour of it. Farmers, landowners, local 
councillors, DQGHQJLQHHUVIURPWKHLQWHUQDOGUDLQDJHERDUGSLQQHGWKHEODPHIRUWKHIORRGVRQ´WKH
(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\>IRU@IDLOLQJWRGUHGJHWKHULYHUVµ:HOOV-RXUQDODYet the Environment 
Agency PDLQWDLQHGWKDW´LQPDQ\FDVHVGUHGJLQJGRHVQRWUHGXFHWKHULVNRIIORRGLQJEHFDXVHULYHUV
TXLFNO\VLOWXSDJDLQQDWXUDOO\µ0RUULV Keen to rid affected areas of troublesome floodwaters 
WKH(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\HPEDUNHGRQWKHFRXQWU\·V ODUJHVWSXPSLng effort since the 1953 floods, 
bringing in 18 extra pumps in addition to the 20 permanent pumping stations (BBC News 2014b, 
House of Commons 2014). %XWZLWKDOODUWLFOHVGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQWRWKH(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\·V
policy to only dredge rivers when it makes financial sense to do so, it came under pressure to justify 
its decisions (or lack thereof). A modelling study for the River Parrett and Tone was commissioned 
by the Environment Agency to assess what effect dredging would have had on the floods. It 
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concluded that whilst dredging could have reduced the duration of the floods from three months to 
three weeks it would not have prevented them (CIWEM 2014).  
News stories continued in the wake of the floods as local government publicly announced its 
´FRPPLWPHQWWRSUHYHQWDUHRFFXUUHQFHRIWKHIORRGV´QRWRQO\EHFDXVHRIWKHDGYHUVHHIIHFWRQ
UHVLGHQWV·OLYHVEXWDOVREHFDXVHRIWKHNQRFN-on effects on the transport and business revenues, as 
WKH QHZV PHGLD GHVFULEHG 6RPHUVHW DV ´FORVHG IRU EXVLQHVVµ DQG UHSRUWHG ´WRXULVWV FDQFHOOLQJ
ERRNLQJVµ6RPHUVHW&RXQW\&RXQFLO$PHHWLQJFRQYHQHGLQPLG-2013 by district and county 
councils affected by the 2012 floods kept local newspaper interest as local politicians, drainage 
authorities, residents and the Environment Agency gathered to discuss a plan of action. A 20-year 
plan to dredge and maintain the rivers was proposed with Somerset County Council committing 
£300,000, and seeking another £3 million to fund the project (Wells Journal 2013a, 2013b). How the 
remainder of the funding would be raised was unclear and became a hotly debated topic. For 
LQVWDQFH0LFKDHO(DYLVWKHIRXQGHURIWKH*ODVWRQEXU\PXVLFIHVWLYDO´ODXQFKHGDILJKWLQJIXQGWR
VDYHWKH6RPHUVHW/HYHOVIURPIORRGLQJµDLPLQJWRUDLVHPLOOion (Independent 2013). FLAG, the 
Flooding on the Levels Action Group, formed after the 2012 floods, also pledged its support to 
raise money. It set about a social media offensive using Facebook and Twitter to keep pressure on 
political actors to ´6WRSWKHIORRGLQJ'UHGJHWKHULYHUV7KHQPDLQWDLQ>WKHP@µ)/$*$V
one respondent told us: 
´7KHIORRGVRIUHDOO\VWDUWHGWRIRFXVSHRSOH·VPLQGVFHUWDLQO\ZLWKWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
FLAG and the lobbying of Lord Smith, who had become the chairman [at the Environment 
$JHQF\@>+H@ZDVOREELHGLQDERXWGUHGJLQJWKHULYHUVVRLW·VQRWDQHZWKLQJEXW,
think the way it was portrayed and the attention it received after the 2012 floods was really 
WKHHYHQWXDOFDWDO\VWµ)ORRG2IILFHU(QYLURQment Agency ² Interview). 
The plan to dredge the Rivers Parrett and Tone, and a subsequent delay, came into sharp 
focus during the 2013/14 floods. That winter became the wettest on record (Met Office 2014) as 
severe weather combined with high spring tides leading to widespread flooding across England, 
affecting over 7,000 properties nationally (CIWEM 2014). Of those properties, only 150 were in the 
Somerset Moors and Levels area (North Moor, Salt Moor, Fordgate and Moorland in Somerset). 
Nonetheless the flooding was extensive in area and duration: floodwaters cut off villages such as 
Muchelney for nearly a month, while places like Thorney had to be temporarily abandoned (House 
of Commons 2014). Between 15th December 2013 and 31st January  2014, the number of newspaper 
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articles on flooding in the area grew six-fold relative to coverage of the previous 2012 floods (n=54 
local and n=66 national, n=120 total). As figure 2 shows, local press were first to cover the floods, 
with attention peaking towards the end of January as Somerset County Council and Sedgemoor 
'LVWULFW&RXQFLO GHFODUHG WKH HYHQW D ´PDMRU LQFLGHQWµ 0RUULV 2QO\RQH ORFDO QHZV DUWLFOH
talked about dredging before 6th January 2014. Yet as the scale and extent of the floods worsened, 
local attention quickly turned to dredging. Of the 35 local articles published from 7th January 2014 
onwards, 60% made explicit reference to dredging of which 77% threw their support behind it. 
Local politicians and drainage engineers called on the government and Environment Agency to 
SURYLGH´PRUH IXQGLQJ WR LQYHVW LQGUHGJLQJµHVSHFLDOO\ for the plan to dredge the Rivers Parrett 
and Tone (Bridgewater Mercury 2014a; 2014b; Wells Journal 2013a), whilst farmers and residents 
OLNHZLVHVXSSRUWHGWKHSODQDV´WKHRQO\ZD\>WRUHVWRUH@WUXVWDQGFRQILGHQFHDPRQJVWWKHIDUPLQJ
DQGZLGHUFRPPXQLW\µ (James 2014).  
[FIGURE 2 ² Newspaper Coverage of the Somerset Levels and Moors Floods, 2013/14] 
National newspapers gave less attention to the story during the same time period, as shown 
in figure 2. Of the 66 broadsheet articles published, the majority, 68%, focused primarily on why 
dredging had not taken place and the difference it might have made. Only 15% of these articles 
flagged up any concerns with dredging, with 67% focusing on its merits.  
Several factors have worked to keep the profile of the story high and hold media interest. 
First, the volume of water, which covered huge swathes of land, made for visually striking pictures 
RISHRSOHDQGWKHLUDQLPDOVKDYLQJWREHUHVFXHG7KLVPDGHIRUFRPSHOOLQJVWRU\WHOOLQJDVWKH´ELUGs 
KDYH JRQH« FDUV KDYH EHHQ VLOHQFHG« KRPHV >OHIW@ UXLQHG EXVLQHVVHV HQGDQJHUHG DQG SDVWXUHV
GHVWUR\HGDQGPDQ\ORFDOVDQJU\µ0RUHWRQ6HFRQGFRQWURYHUV\RYHUZKHWKHUWRGUHGJHWKH
rivers, and the merits/concerns associated with it, pitted different experts against each other over 
JRYHUQPHQWSROLF\DQGIXQGLQJDV´HYHU\WKLQJ>JRW@FDXJKWXSLQSROLWLFVµ&ORYHU7KLUGWKH
political makeup of the Somerset region - a mixture of Conservative and Liberal-Democrat 
constituencies - made for combative debates within the Coalition government over its public policy 
and who should be blamed.  
Initially blame was levelled  DW WKH (QYLURQPHQW $JHQF\ ´IRU QHJOHFWLQJ ORFDO ULYHUVµ DQG
OHWWLQJ WKHP´VLOWXSµ 0RUHWRQ, with critics including the local campaign group FLAG, the 
celebrity Michael Eavis and the local MP (Warburton 2014). Critics then turned to the funding 
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allocated to the region by central government and the difficulty in satisfying the cost-
benefit thresholds needed to fund dredging as stipulated by the Treasury (Telegraph 2014b) before 
ILQDOO\ IRFXVLQJRQ WKHHIIHFW WKDW DXVWHULW\ FXWVZHUHKDYLQJRQ´WKH(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\µ who 
ZHUH WKUHDWHQHG ZLWK ´ORVLQJ  VWDII DQG SRWHQWLDOO\ D ORW RI H[SHUWLVHµ &ORYHU  Lastly, 
visits from influential figures such as the Secretary for the Environment, Owen Pattison, Chairman 
of the Environment Agency, Lord Smith, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the 
3ULQFHRI:DOHVVHUYHGWRNHHSWKHPHGLD·VVSRWOLJKWRQ6RPHUVHWHJ%%&1HZVD 
Not only did these media stories focus attention on the floods themselves but they also 
mobilised pre-existing, alternative policy options for how rivers should be managed, akin to 
.LQJGRQ·V KHXULVWLF $OO WKUHH RI .LQJGRQ·V VWUHDPV DUH DOLJQHG KHUH DV WKH problem of repeated, 
severe and long-lasting flooding converged with the politics of environmental protection funding, 
alongside a local groundswell of support for a pre-existing policy response based on dredging rivers. 
Heeding these concerns, the British Prime Minister David Cameron told reporters on 2nd February 
2014 that the ongoing IORRGV ZHUH ´XQDFFHSWDEOH DQG« RYHUUXOHG WKH (QYLURQPHQW $JHQF\ WR
RUGHUGUHGJLQJRIQHDUE\ULYHUVDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOHµ0DVRQ:LWKLQDUHODWLYHO\VKRUWVSDFHRI
time the government policy on dredging had been reversed ² at least in this locality and at least for 
the time being. 
 
4.2 Why did river dredging emerge as the answer to the 2013/14 floods? 
As floodwaters receded in early March 2014, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, paved the way for 
an agreement between the Environment Agency, local authorities, drainage boards and the 
Department of Transport for a 20-year Flood Action Plan for the Somerset Levels and Moors. Lord 
Smith of Finsbury, Chairman of the Environment Agency assured the community that additional 
funds would be allocated to repair all flood defence assets for the future (House of Commons 2014: 
6).  Over the next two decades, £100 million is to be spent on dredging the rivers and providing 
extra pumping stations. This commitment marked a key victory for the pro-dredging campaign of 
local residents. It also pointed to the growing role of localist politics (Haughton and Allmendinger, 
2014). 
Why momentum for action gathered at this point and not immediately after the 2012 floods, 
appears to be related to two main catalysts. First, campaigners and newspapers began reporting that 
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the channel capacity of the Rivers Parrett and Tone had reduced to 65% of their 1960s levels (see 
Matlby 2013). Investigations following the 2012 floods led the Environment Agency to commission 
a modeling study to assess the effect of dredging the rivers. That study quickly became a focal point 
in news stories. As media interest intensified from 7th January 2014 onwards, 16% of local and 
QDWLRQDOQHZVSDSHUDUWLFOHVRIORFDOQHZVSDSHUDUWLFOHVGUHZUHDGHUV·DWWHQWLRQWRWKLVQ 
local and n=6 national, n=16 total out of n=99). Pro-dredging campaigners used the 65% figure to 
lend credibility to their claim that lack of maintenance silted up the rivers (Carter 2014). As a result, 
campaigners used the findings to mobilise support, as one of our respondents told us: 
´%HFDXVHRIZKDWKDSSHQHGLQZHUHYLHZHGWKHPRGHOOLQJ«DQGIRXQGWKDWFKDQQHO
size makes a big difference to the volumes of water which pass through the channels. We 
knew dredging made a difference and would have reduced the duration and frequency of a 
flood except there was no way to fund it. So when the politicians asked about dredging 
after the recent floods, we were able to hand them all the evidence that we had gathered in 
VXSSRUWRILWµ(QJLQHHU6RPHUVHW'UDLQDJH%RDUGV&RQVRUWLXP² Interview).  
Second, the creation of the Flooding on the Levels Action Group (FLAG) kept pressure on 
the government and its agencies to justify its anti-dredging policy, explain why they had not acted 
sooner and importantly ensured that the floods remained a high-profile news story. On the one 
hand, FLAG helped to give a voice to local residents and allow them to vent their frustrations about 
WKH(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\ZKRPWKH\EHOLHYHGZHUH LJQRULQJ WKH IDFW´WKDW LI WKH ULYHUVKDGEHHQ
dredged this would have cleared them of silt, making them wider and deeper and easier to maintain. 
This would create more capacity to carry away floodwaters, draining the flood plain far more 
TXLFNO\µ &DUWHU  )/$*·V VRFLDO PHGLD FDPSDLJQ RQ )DFHERRN DQG 7ZLWWHU ZDV FRQVLGHUHG
significant: 
´)/$*OLYHGLQWKHWKLFNRILW«>WKH\·UH@DYHU\SRZHUIXOSUHVVXUHJURXS«>DQGWKHLU@XVH
RIVRFLDOPHGLDZDVDUHDOGULYHULQWKHIORRGVPRUHWKDQDQ\RWKHUWLPH«VRFLDOPHGLDZDV
DW WKH IRUH RI PDNLQJ WKLQJV KDSSHQ DOPRVW LQVWDQWO\µ )ORRG 2IILFHU  (QYLURQPHQW
Agency  ² Interview).  
On the other KDQGZK\´DQJU\UHVLGHQWV«>KDGWR@IRUPDQDFWLRQJURXSWRFDPSDLJQIRU
ULYHU GUHGJLQJ DV WKH EHVW ZD\ RI WDFNOLQJ ZHHNV RI IORRGVµ EHFDPH D QHZV VWRU\ LWVHOI RYHU WKH
government failing to listen, or respond, to local needs (Weaver 2014). FLAG, as a consequence, 
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became an influential actor in the growing media coverage, with 82% of articles discussing its pro-
dredging policy from 7th January 2014 (n=35 local and n=58 national, n=93 total). This political 
profile, coupled with the findings from the modelling study, made it harder to ignore river dredging 
as a viable flood management option.  
The problem of floods happening too frequently was now tied to a policy response based on 
dredging rivers - yet the politics of why dredging has historically been ignored still needs to be 
explained. Here we provide an account of the circumstances in some depth, but the full reasons for 
the policy change remain debatable and open to further empirical investigation1. We were told that 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG SROLWLFDO FRQVWUDLQWV VXFK DV WKH 7UHDVXU\·V  FRVW-benefit ratio made it very 
difficult to fund dredging (Flood Officer 2, Environment Agency ² Interview). Indeed, when 
´EXGJHWVDUHWLJKWPDLQWHQDQFH³ in particular, watercourse conveyance and dredging ³ is the first 
thing to be cut. In the face of limited budgets, low-priority areas such as farmland are sacrificed in 
IDYRXU RI XUEDQ KLJKO\ SRSXODWHG DUHDVµ +RXVH RI &RPPRQV   VHH DOVR 3DUNHU 
Johnson & Penning-5RZVHOO,W´ZDVDELWRIDVKRFNµ WKHUHIRUHZKHQWKH´3ULPH0LQVWHU
RYHUWXUQHG·WKHSROLF\E\VD\LQJWKDWWKLV¶ZDVDVSHFLDOFDVHµ)ORRG2IILFHU(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\
² Interview).  
Yet the politics of dredging suddenly changed. No longer was dredging in this locality 
subject to economic efficacy tests and no longer were its adverse environmental impacts viewed as 
DQ REVWDFOH $V RQH RI RXU UHVSRQGHQW H[SODLQHG ´GUHGJLQJ LV YHU\ YLVLEOH (YHU\RQH VHHV WKH
machines and notices a differencH LQ WKH ULYHUV LPPHGLDWHO\ DIWHUZDUGV« 'UHGJLQJ ORRNV OLNH LW
PDNHV D GLIIHUHQFH 0D\EH QRW HFRQRPLFDOO\ EXW WKH FRPPXQLWLHV FDQ VHH LWµ )ORRG 2IILFHU 
Environment Agency ² Interview). Whether or not dredging actually makes a difference matters 
very little compared to its ability to defuse a potentially tricky political problem: 
´&DPHURQ·VGUHGJHSOHGJHLVOLNHWKHEDGJHUFXOO,WLVXVHOHVV,WLVFRXQWHUSURGXFWLYH%XWLW
keeps the farmers happy and allows the government to be seen to be doing something: 
something decisive and muscular and visible. And that, in these dismal times, appears to be 
DOOWKDWFRXQWVµ0RQELRW 
                                                          
1 An anonymous reviewer suggests that one possibility, which we agree merits further investigation, may relate to 
particular attributes of some of the campaigners. Anecdotally at least, it appears not uncommon in successful local land 
use planning campaigns (e.g. Upham and Shackley, 2006) to find that some of the advocates are relatively well-resourced, 
including in terms of social and professional connections and status. This resourcing likely helps campaign processes. 
Quite how important this was (if at all) in this case, is unclear. 
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Flood experts we interviewed were similarly surprised by this sudden reversal in government 
policy. They shared the view that iWZDV´XQWUXHµWRVXJJHVWWKDW´LI\RXGUHGJHGWKHULYHUVSHUIHFWO\
\RX ZRXOG KDYH QR IORRGLQJ« >DV@ YROXPHV RI ZDWHU MXVW GRQ·W DFW OLNH WKDWµ )ORRG ([SHUW 
University Professor ² ,QWHUYLHZ1RWRQO\LVLW´DFUXHORIIHURIIDOVHKRSHWRWKRVHOLYLQJ in flood 
SURQHFRPPXQLWLHVµWRVXJJHVWWKDWGUHGJLQJZRXOGSUHYHQWIXWXUHIORRGVEXWLW·V´XQVXSSRUWHGE\
ERWK VFLHQFHDQGHYLGHQFHµ &,:(07KLV LVQRW WR VXJJHVW WKDWGUHGJLQJFDQQRWSOD\ D
role in reducing the frequency and duration of local flooding, but that its effect on river flow, 
wildlife/habitats and its erosion of riverbanks should be carefully considered (Hadlington 2003). 
Winter floods, for example, can provide summer irrigation for livestock and help sustain a rich 
diversity of wildlife. A high-water table, and regular flooding, means parts of the Somerset Levels 
and Moors are designated Special Protection Area and Sites of Special Scientific Interest because of 
the winter birds they attract (CIWEM 2014).  
Unable to insure or mortgage their homes, local residents felt trapped. But possibilities other 
WKDQ GUHGJLQJ H[LVW LQ SULQFLSOH UHVLGHQWV ´FRXOG EH RIIHUHG DVVLVWDQFH LI WKH\ ZDQW WR OHDYH :H
FRXOG EX\ WKHLU KRPHV RII WKHP« LW PLJKW EH FKHDSHU WKDQ WU\LQJ WR VWRS WKH IORRGLQJµ )ORod 
Expert 2, University Professor ² ,QWHUYLHZ )XUWKHUPRUH ´IDUPHUV ZKR UHFHLYH VXEVLGLHV IRU
SURGXFLQJIRRGFRXOG LQVWHDGEHSDLGIRUVWRULQJZDWHUµ:HEVWHU It is unclear whether the 
latter proposals would be feasible or suitable to other flooding events in the UK, especially given the 
understandable reluctance of people to leave their homes or community, with which they have 
strong emotional attachments (see Harries 2012). Dredging, by contrast, appears to offer a simpler, 
more immediate and visible solution. Yet closer reading of the Somerset Levels and Moors Flood 
Action Plan reveals that whilst £5.7 million has been allocated to return the Rivers Parrett and Tone 
to their 1960s profile in 2014 there is little detail about what happens afterwards, as one of our 
respondents remarked: 
´:H DUH QRZ DSSURDFKLQJ $XJXVW >@ DQG >WKH (QYLURQPHQW Agency] finishes in 
2FWREHUDQGEDVLFDOO\ZHGRQRWNQRZZKDWKDSSHQVIURPWKHUHRQ:HGRQ·WNQRZ LI
WKHUHZLOOEHGUHGJLQJQH[W\HDURUHYHQ WKH\HDUDIWHU WKDWEXW LI WKHUH LVQ·WJRLQJ WREH
some sort of ongoing maintenance, in another ten years or eYHQILYH\HDUVZH·OOEHEDFNWR
VTXDUHRQH7KHVHULYHUVVLOWXSWHUULEO\TXLFNO\µ/RFDO5HVLGHQW² Interview). 
Indeed the first phase of the 20-year Flood Action Plan has now been completed (this being 
in October 2014). The Environment Agency will no longer provide any funds, with responsibility 
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for raising money falling to the local authorities, drainage boards, and local residents in the Somerset 
Levels and Moors to complete the scheme (Flood Officer 1, Environment Agency ² Interview). 
Given that the same local actors struggled to raise funds to dredge the rivers following the 2012 
floods, the national policy reversal is beginning to look temporary rather than a signal of things to 
come (Penning-Rowsell et al 2005). It does, however, set an interesting precedent for future flood 
events both locally and nationally.  
 
5. Conclusion: Reversing UK flood policy? 
The policy response to the 2013-14 flooding of the Somerset Levels and Moors can be understood 
as arising from the conjunction of the three different streams of events that Kingdon (1995) posits 
(problem, policy and politics). Analysis of newsprint media coverage in the period before and during 
the event, supplemented by stakeholder interviews, provides evidence of the way in which dredging 
as a solution became highlighted and eventually adopted during the period in which the problem, policy 
and politics converge. Local political activists mobilised a wider campaign with the help of social 
media and capitalised on national and local political sensitivities, to promote their preferred policy 
solution. This involved a substantial change in Environment Agency policy, with a 20-year flood 
plan introduced that included dredging. 
Less clear is the longevity of the policy reversal, especially given funding constraints and the 
GHSHQGHQFH RI GUHGJLQJ RQ VXVWDLQHG FRVWO\ LQWHUYHQWLRQ )URP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI .LQJGRQ·V
framework (1995), crises provide an opportunity for enhancing social learning and accelerated policy 
change (Johnson et al 2005): it is those policies that are ready to be exploited during a window of 
opportunity and that are amenable to refinement during periods of stability and incremental change 
that are prime candidates for adoption. To be ready for adoption in a time of crisis, such policies 
require monitoring and knowledge of issues, actors and associated ideas.  Such was the case in this 
event, in which local engineers in the Drainage Board Consortium concluded that dredging would 
be the most effective solution, contrar\WRWKH(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\·VSRVLWLRQ 
Nonetheless, the measures that were previously favored remain available (including 
addressing upper and mid-catchment management, urban run-off and increasing infrastructural 
resilience), ready for new crises to potentially shift circumstances back in their favour. Little-
discussed, new options may also emerge, such as the potential for a tidal lagoon to provide off-shore 
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volume for flood drainage (BBC News 2014c). In this case, popular pressure helped to catalyze 
policy change in the context of particular national politics playing out locally. Local residents proved 
WREHPRUHLQIOXHQWLDOWKDQ(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\H[SHUWVDQG.LQJGRQ·V framework helps to explain 
why. However, we can also observe that the framework is such a broad heuristic that it can hardly 
fail to capture the key influences - of course problems, policies and politics are involved in how and why 
policy changes. What the framework fails to do is inform understandings at higher levels of 
resolution, such as distinguishing between instances when popular pressure mediated by social and 
broadcast media may (or may not) achieve similar, catalytic effects. Moreover the framework suffers 
from temporality blindness: UK flood risk management policy in the UK remains in a state of flux, 
not least because of combined financial and climatic change pressures. It was always clear that 
GUHGJLQJLVDFRVWO\RSWLRQWKDWPXVWEHFRQWLQXDOO\UHQHZHG.LQJGRQ·VWKHVLVFDQWHOOXVOLWWOHDERXW
to what extent this option will be relied upon in the long term, only that if there is further rapid 
policy change with respect to region-specific flooding, it is likely to involve pre-H[LVWLQJ ¶VROXWLRQV·
and to be politically advantageous to some. If any stakeholders have different, or preferred options, 
they would do well to prepare their case now, ready for the next crisis. 
Returning to the issue of localism and flood risk management showcased by this case study, 
Green (2014) and Begg et al (2015) raise further concerns over the willingness of, and capacity for, 
communities to manage flood risk locally and the inequalities they may face. For instance, Green 
(2014) argues that the Somerset Levels and Moors communities cleverly mobilized the media and 
political attention over the need for urgent action rather than accept that they must adapt. Given the 
financial restrictions on public expenditure, Green (2014) argues that communities will have a stark 
choice to make in years to come: accept the risk of being flooded more frequently and intensely or 
pay to defend themselves. Yet our research suggests that responsibility for managing local flood risk 
is not only continually deferred upwards but communities may also struggle to secure the funding to 
protect themselves. After the 2012/13 floods, the council was unable to raise the £3million needed 
to dredge the Rivers Parrett and Tone. Unless the financial contribution expected from the local 
community is realistic and appealing little is likely to change. 
Begg et al (2015), by contrast, point to the inequalities that localism can create. They ask: 
what happens to areas/communities that lack the local partners to fund flood risk measures? Rural 
communities like the Somerset Levels and Moors are a prime example. Either nothing will happen 
or communities will remain reliant on the state for help. Our research, however, highlights two 
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further inequalities. First, what happens in communities where a clear power imbalance exists 
between local partners? And where particular agendas proceed without much opposition? For 
instance, river dredging may satisfy the needs of the farming lobby EXWZKHWKHULW·VLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRI
others in the communities or wider environment, and how sustainable or effective it is, become 
almost secondary concerns. A network analysis is urgently needed for the recent 2015/16 flood 
events across Cumbrian and York to understand the influence different actors play in setting local 
flood risk agendas. Second, the local preference for physical, visible, hard engineering solutions such 
as river dredging over softer measures of working with nature to restore riverbanks, raises questions 
over their long-term effectiveness and sustainability are sidelined. Although these hard engineering 
solutions may be cheaper and quicker to yield results in the short-term, we need to ask whether the 
political convenience of these solutions comes at the expense of devaluing expert advice. 
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Figure captions 
FIGURE 1 ² Newspaper Coverage For or Against Dredging in Somerset, 1994-2013 
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FIGURE 2 ² Newspaper Coverage of the Somerset Levels and Moors Floods, 2013/14 
 
 
